Fighting between tribes and government troops. Tens of thousands more made refugee since last month. Thousands of civilians stuck in between. Over 200,000 refugees since 2004 when the first of now five cycles of conflict started.

This is the state of Yemen today. The nation has long lacked a cohesive central government. Yemen was the site of a years-long civil war in the 1960s between the reigning conservative monarch the revolutionary communists. The country was divided between north and south Yemen.

The country is equally divided now, though on sectarian and ideological grounds. And the divide is not between north-south, but now between north-central-south.

First the north: the Yemeni government in Sana’a is fighting a tribal insurgency in the north-west regions of Sadda, Jawf, Hajjah and Amran under the auspicious of the Houthis clan. The cause here is one of socioeconomic rather than ideological (even though strains of the latter are present in fanatical slogans). In 1991, Saudi Arabia forcibly expelled roughly one million Yemeni expatriate workers in the Kingdom in retaliation for Yemen’s declared support for Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Kuwait. The returning workers, many of them youth, came from the aforementioned northern regions. Returning home they found unemployment and despair. Many of the people joined a radical cult offshoot of Zaydi, a Shiite sect exclusive to Yemen and encompassing a 1/3 of the people. Zaydi is peaceful, but the new organization - called Believing Youth - played on the frustrations of many northerners whom have long believed that Sana’a has long been indifferent to their region. Believing Youth was launched by a family member from the Houthis clan, and started an insurrection against the central government on the Zaydi reasoning that resistance is legitimate against incompetent rulers.

Fighting first started in 2004. Believing Youth did not have a hard time get weaponry since Yemen is awash - second only to Peshawar in Pakistan - with Black Market weapons from propelled grenades to anti-tanks launchers. The army was first successful in rounding up the Houthis family and killing many of them. But the war always restarted for several reasons: first, frustrations are strong and leadership assassinations will only leave a temporary vacuum. The government is treating the symptom rather than the cure. Second, the army’s heavy bombing campaign has killed and injured many civilians which has only playing into Believing Youth propaganda that the central government is indifferent to the north; thus drawing more recruits. Third, the army has also undertaken another step that backfired: enlisting tribes. Instead of making the campaign against the Houthis clan one of a sovereign state against a domestic insurrection that should be dealt with by non-partisan government troops. This being the Middle East - where tribal identity is salient - the army enlisted other northern tribes against the Houthis clan. This played into the Houthis’ hands since the family then convinced other northern tribes whom are aligned against the tribes the army happened to recruit that if the government wins then the current tribes aligned with the government will dominate the north. The army indirectly made more enemies for itself by provoking several northern tribes - whom has sat on the sidelines - to join the war alongside the Houthis clan for fear that the current tribes aligned with the government - whom are historic foes - will rule over them if Sana’a wins. Another example of short-sighted and inept organization. This was escalated tensions and war and it is not clear if the government can once again rule the north. The terrain is incredibly tough - endless mountains and cliffs - and government troops are losing heavy army through guerrilla attacks. In fact, Believing Youth is not using weapons taken from the army in raids including tanks. Both sides blame foreign interference. The government in Sana’s - which is Shiite - is claiming the Believing Youth is sponsored by Iran while the latter retorts that the former is a client of Saudi Arabia. In reality, Iran has nothing to do with the conflict and Saudi Arabia (which many Yemenis dislike for what they perceive to be the ultra-conservative cultural baggage being imported from the country) is a reluctant ally of Yemen and only props up the government for fear that if it fell there would be a huge refugee crisis on the common border.

As for the second conflict: Islamic fundamentalists. While the government fights northern tribes, it is also fighting against al-Qeada aligned fundamentalists in the south. Yemen has become an refugee - one not invited by normal Yemenis - for Islamic extremists and terrorists. Overwhelming these are non-Yemenis and overwhelmingly they are Saudis - many of them even graduates of Saudi Arabia’s un-indoctrination seminars which are an attempt to reform terrorists into law-abiding civilians. The Saudi police crackdown has lead many al-Qeade members into poorly-run and policied Yemen where geographic is an added bonus for the south is also tough terrain. al-Qeade threatens an insurgence in the south where members are currently broadcasting videos from and attacks - including one against the U.S. embassy - have been launched.

The government in Sana’a is not the most competent or liberal, but Western nations are actively supporting it: Just look at the armor the Yemeni army is using:

U.S.A. written all over it. Western nations fear that al-Qadea will find a new Afghanistan in south Yemen and the problem will only be worse if the entire government were to fall. The government is fighting nothing less but a war for survival. That is why The Economist recently asked about Yemen: the world’s next failed state?

Such a scenario would not only be tragic for Yemen’s 30 million people, but for the Middle East which would once again be host to an Arab tragedy and to world security since a power vacuum would be a great training ground of terrorist.