The United States Army War College has just issued a new report on the 2006 Summer war between Lebanese party-cum-militia Hezbollah and Israel. “The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy” provides some words that Hezbollah may very well use in its propaganda.

The report notes that although Hezbollah is a guerrilla outfit, its discipline on the battlefield, coordinates attacks and ability to dig itself in and hold on to territory make is a formidable conventional force.

The report rated Hezbollah as more effective against the IDF than any Arab army that has ever confronted Israel. Israel was able to - in a preemptive attack - bring Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies to a standstill after just six days of warfare in 1967. But after a whole month of war, Israel was unable to defeat Hezbollah as a force in Lebanon or even to stop rocket fire from the group falling on Israeli northern towns.

Instead of a unilateral surrender from Hezbollah, Israel had to do what it never has with an Arab army: agree to a cease-fire. And Israel got back its two kidnapped soldiers - whose abduction triggered the war - only this year and only after negotiations with Hezbollah that let to the exchange of the two soldiers for over 300 alive and deceased Arabs held by Israel.

Further, the report noted that Hezbollah inflicted more death and wounds against Israeli troops per Hezbollah troop at a rate matched by not other Arab army.

“In particular, critics of irregular-warfare transformation often cite the 2006 case as evidence that non-state actors can nevertheless wage conventional warfare in state-like ways,” the report added.

Israeli intended to weaken Hezbollah, instead the war boosted Hezbollah’s image in Lebanon and has made Hassan Nasrallah the most regarded Arab leader in the region.

Despite frequent Israeli violations of Lebanese air and land space, the Lebanon-Israel border is calm and no one foresees and hostile breakout.

The U.S. report emphasized the need to learn the lessons of the war as a guide for how the U.S. military should respond to any similar threats.